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Abstract
This study analyzes the effects of public policy on charitable giving. More specifically, it looks
at the effects of No Child Left Behind, The Affordable Care Act, and the Clean Power Plan has
on charitable organizations geared towards education, healthcare and environmentalism
respectively. Using IRS Business Master File data with a difference-in-differences fixed effects
model, I find that public policy has a negative impact on giving to education and environmental
nonprofits and a positive effect on giving to health nonprofits. Furthermore, these results show a
lasting effect with an even larger impact for subsequent years of each policy. For nonprofits
focused on education and environmental issues, it appears that public policy is seen as a
substitute for charitable donations, while for health nonprofits, it is a complement.
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Introduction
Between 2005 and 2015, the number of nonprofits in the United States has grown by
10.4%, and the total amount donated has increased by 28.4% when adjusted for inflation. In
2015, the nonprofit sector comprised 5.4% of the United States GDP (McKeever, 2018). In
recent years, economists have turned their attention towards studying charitable economics and
the different economic and noneconomic factors that impact it. Most of these studies, however,
focus on the effects of tax policy on charitable giving (Brooks, 2007), what effects the market for
giving (List, 2011), or who gives and how much (James & Sharpe, 2007). Studies on tax policy
show that tax credits do lead to an overall increase in charitable giving (De Vita & Twombly,
2004). However, when looking at the effects of a nonprofit receiving direct government funding,
studies indicate there is a crowding out effect for private contributions (Andreoni & Payne,
2003).
It is also possible that other non-tax related policies can impact charitable giving.
Government intervention in a specific social issue by means of public policy may influence a
donor’s decision-making process when deciding whether to donate to a charity with the same
mission. Some donors might feel that the governments increased involvement is enough to
remedy the issue, and therefore, it is no longer necessary for them to donate to such a nonprofit.
Alternatively, an increase in awareness caused by the new policy may galvanize individuals to
donate. Though nonprofits advocate for government policies that help them achieve their
mission, there has been no analysis on how implementing such policies can affect their revenue.
This study analyzes the effects of public policy on charitable giving. More specifically, it
looks at the effects of No Child Left Behind, The Affordable Care Act, and the Clean Power Plan
on the total revenue of charitable organizations with missions geared towards education,
healthcare, and environmentalism respectively. Three different policy types are used in order to
4

see if donors who support a specific mission react differently than others. Evidence of this is
demonstrated in Brooks’ (2007) analysis of tax price elasticity for each nonprofit subsector. He
finds that donors for each subsector respond differently to changes in tax policy. These policies
were chosen specifically because each enacted major reform to the current systems in place.
This paper use IRS Exempt Organization Business Master File data provided by the
National Center for Charitable Statistics. Though there is research on the effects of tax policy on
charitable giving and research on the impacts of these policies within their own sector, there is
little to no research on how these kinds federal policies affect charitable giving. Brooks (2007)
and Bakija and Hiem (2008) both estimate the tax price elasticity for charitable giving, while List
(2011) focuses on how charitable giving responds to the overall economic environment. I
propose that the policies listed above will have a negative effect on the total revenue of
nonprofits whose missions are of similar purpose.

Literature Review
Extensive research has been done to determine what effects charitable giving. Majority of
the literature on charitable giving focuses on three questions: what are the effects of tax policy on
charitable giving, what economic and demographic factors effect charitable giving, and does
government funding lead to a crowding out of donations? Looking within the literature for each
policy, the focus is primarily on the effectiveness of the policy and its impact within the sector.
“Income Tax Policy and Charitable Giving” estimates the tax price elasticity of
charitable giving across six different nonprofit subsectors (Brooks, 2007). Using a FIML tobit
model with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Brooks finds that elasticity isn’t
constant for the six different subsects (2007). Some nonprofit giver types have a weak reaction to
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tax policy changes, such as health nonprofits, while others have a stronger reaction to tax policy
changes, such as combination nonprofits. Combination nonprofits are nonprofits that fit under
multiple subsectors. This study showed variation in price elasticity of giving with a range of 0.58
to 2.68 for health and combination nonprofits respectively, both of which were statistically
significant (Brooks, 2007). It is clear tax policy doesn’t affect all subsectors equally, so treating
them with a uniform elasticity can prove to be ineffective when setting tax policies.
Bakija and Hiem’s (2008) estimate the elasticity of charitable giving using high-income
individuals tax return data for the years 1979-96 and 1999-2005. High-income individuals were
used because they account for 30 percent of overall charitable giving and they experienced the
most variation in tax incentive during the study period. They used a two-stage least square
regression and fixed effects model to estimate a log-log demand equation. Predictable changes in
federal and state tax law was used as an instrument for future changes in price and income.
(Bakija & Hiem, 2008). To distinguish between short-term and long-term price changes, Bakija
and Hiem included lagged and future changes in price and income in the model. Their
analysis estimates that the elasticity of giving with respect to a persistent price change is about 0.7 (Bakija & Hiem, 2008).
In “The Nature and Cause of the U-shaped Charitable Giving Profile” (2007), James and
Sharpe examine why the charitable giving profile is U-shaped using data from the U.S
Department of Labor’s Consumer Expenditure Survey. In the U.S the lowest and highest income
brackets give the highest percent of their incomes to charity, creating the U-Shape profile. This
was often believed to be caused by highly devoted, lower income households donating to
religious organizations (James & Sharpe, 2007). This study, however, provides more insight.
James and Sharpe find that retirement age households who are considered low-income but retain
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high-assets are a contributing factor to the U-Shape charitable giving profile. Of households that
are committed to charitable giving, committed being defined as a household that gave 10% or
more of their income, 48% of the households making $30,000 or less were retirement age
households compared to 15% who earn $80,000.00 or more (James & Sharpe, 2007).
John List’s paper “The Market for Charitable Giving” (2011) discusses the effects of the
S&P 500 stock price index on charitable giving. In this paper he finds that not only is charitable
giving more responsive to positive increases in the S&P 500 than decreases, but that 40% of the
percentage change in variation of charitable giving is accounted for by the variation in
percentage change from the S&P 500 one year before. His results show that a 1% increase in the
S&P 500 correlated with a 0.19% increase in charitable giving the following year. In the same
paper he found that Religious organizations are less responsive to changes in the S&P 500 and
that lower income individuals are more likely to donate to these types of organizations (List,
2011).
In Hartmann and Werding (2012) paper, they explore if volunteering time and donating
money are substitutes or complements. They use data from the European Social Survey from
2002-2003. The data set provides information on charitable behavior and civic engagement from
charitable organizations across 22 European countries (Hartmann & Werding, 2012). Using a
bivariate probit model, the study found that donating time and money were complements instead
of substitutes. For individuals who only donated time, having an average and above average
income had a positive effect on the probability that an individual donates. If donating time was a
substitute of donating money, higher incomes would see a negative effect on donating since it
would be more costly (Hartmann & Werding, 2012).
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In “Motivational Crowding Out Effect in Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence,”
(2020) Muller and Rau utilize a modified dictator game to measure crowding out effects for
donation motivations. There experiment consists of four parts. The first two parts allows them to
determine a subject’s guilt parameters and risk preferences before the two donation phases
(Muller & Rau, 2020). In the first donation phase, subjects choose an amount to donate to the
German Red Cross and are previously informed that there will be three states of donating. All
donation states have the same probability of being chosen for each subject and once they choose
a donation amount, their state will be revealed (Muller & Rau, 2020). The neutral state is used as
a benchmark, the reimbursement state results in 50% of the amount they chose to donate being
reimbursed back to them, and subjects matched to the subsequent payment state are required to
pay an extra 50% of the donation amount. The second donation phase, subjects once again
choose an amount to donate, but there were no price effects after donating (Muller & Rau, 2020).
The experiment found that overall, donations decrease from the first donation round to the
second, and there are no statistical differences between the reimbursement and subsequent price
state. It also found that individuals with a high guilt parameter donate more at the first donation
opportunity, but during the second donation opportunity they donate more than two times less
after having experienced a price effect than those who experienced no effect (Muller & Rau,
2020). A replication study was performed using subjects who have previously participated in an
economic study. The results supported the previous studies outcomes.
Andreoni and Payne’s paper “Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out
Giving of Fund-raising?” (2003) they discuss if nonprofits reduce fundraising efforts after
receiving a government grant. Using tax return data from 1982-1998 of 534 social service
nonprofits and 233 art nonprofits, they confirm this hypothesis (Andreoni & Payne, 2003). A
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two-stage least square regression is used to estimate the relationship between government
funding and fundraising expenditures, with National Institute of Health Funding lagged by one
year as an instrument. Andreoni and Payne found that art organizations see an average decrease
of $264 in fundraising expenditures for every $1,000 of government grants they receive, and
social service organizations see an average decrease of $54 for every $1,000 of government
grants they receive (Andreoni & Payne, 2003). Both estimates are statistically significant.
Research by de Andres-Alonso et al. analyzes the effects of public grants on private
charitable giving for 67 international cooperation and development nonprofits in Spain. In “The
Impact of Public Funding on the Different Types of Private Contributions” (2019), they find that
there is partial crowding-out effect from public grants. Using a generalized method of moments,
the results show that private contributions decreases by €0.43 for every €1.00 received (de
Andres-Alonso et al., 2019). When looking further into the effects of public grants on the
different types of private giving, the results are slightly different. Though there is a general
negative effect for all private giving types, de Andres-Alonso et al. find that have the largest
negative effect is on individual one-time donations. One-time donations see a decrease of €0.17
for every €1.00 of public grants received, while periodic donations see a decrease of €0.08 for
every €1.00 of public grants received (de Andres-Alonso et al., 2019). Both these results are
statistically significant. Corporate donations and revenue from sales also see a negative effect,
but the results are not significant. De Andres-Alonso et al. suggest that for corporations, this may
be because the nonprofits in their data receive most of their funding from public grants, so they
are not investing as much of their fundraising efforts into these other revenue generating efforts
(2019).

9

“Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants”
examines if crowding out also happens in the opposite direction (Heutel, 2014). Heutel
investigates if increased private contributions leads to a decrease in public funding, and if
government grants act as a signal of charity quality that then results in an increase private giving.
To achieve this, he uses a tobit and fixed effect models, and instrumental variables with 990 form
charity tax return data from 1998 to 2003 provided by the National Center for Charitable
Statistics (Heutel, 2014). He uses both an organization- fixed effect variable and year-fixed
effect variable. For instrumental variables he uses Supplementary Security Income programs
state-level measures of government transfers to individuals and charity level membership dues
provided on the 990 form (Heutel, 2014). His analysis starts by estimating the effect of
government grants on charitable giving. Overall, his results suggest that for every $1 increase in
government grants there is a $0.10 to $0.30 increase in private donations. He then examines the
effects of private giving on government grants. The results for this are mixed and insignificant,
indicating that there is no effect (Heutel, 2014). Lastly, he examines the potential crowding in
effect of government grants. Heutel find the charity quality signal from receiving a government
grant is stronger for younger nonprofits. The results show that the crowding in effect decreases
by 1 to 2 cents for each year the charity has been open. The results also indicate that government
grants start crowding out individual donations at about 40 years of age (Heutel, 2014).
Simmons and Emanuele expand on the crowding out effects of government funding by
evaluating how it impacts volunteering. In “Does Government Spending Crowd Out Donations
of Time and Money?” they analyze the impact of local and state level government expenditures
on donations of time and finances (Simmons & Emanuele, 2004). To do this, they utilize data
from Giving and Volunteering, 1996 that is collected by the Gallup Organization and the
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Independent Sector, and Government Finances provided by the Department of Finance.
Simmons and Emanuele find that donations of finances and time both decrease when there is an
increase in local and state government expenditures (Simmons & Emanuele, 2004). Though the
impacts of government expenditures are negative, the coefficients are significantly small in both
cases, and therefore are not likely to have much of an economic impact.
On January 8th, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act
into law. This act required states to test and report on students in grades 3 through 8, and again in
high school. The purpose of this act was to bring all students up to a proficient level of math and
reading by the 2013-14 school year (Klein, 2015). Each state defined their own proficiency
levels and how to test for it. Schools who failed to meet the minimum yearly standard were
required to allow students to transfer to better performing schools and to provide free tutoring for
students. Under extreme cases, the state would intervene (Klein, 2015). By 2010, it was clear that
most states were not going to meet their proficiency levels and the act was replaced by the Every
Student Succeeds Act.
In Wang and Fahey’s (2011) study, they analyze the effect of No Child Left Behind on
parental volunteering in schools. They use a logistic regression and a generalized linear model on
cross-sectional data from the Current Population Survey. The study found that there is a decrease
in the rate in which parents volunteer from 2002 to 2008 (Wang & Fahey, 2011). The results also
show that those who live in metropolitan areas were less likely to volunteer than their
counterparts. When accounting for differences in demographics, they find that white women who
are citizens are the most likely to volunteer. Another finding is that “Hispanic parents in the
West are more likely to volunteer for education than their counterparts in the Northeast and
South region” (Wang & Fahey, 2011). All these results are found to be statistically significant.
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As stated earlier, Hartmann and Werding (2012) found that volunteering time is a compliment to
donating money. From this, it is easy to see the possible links between public policy and
charitable giving.
The Affordable Care Act was signed into effect on March 23, 2010, with further
amendments signed in on March 31st, 2010. The act aimed to expand access to healthcare,
further protect consumers, and improve the overall healthcare system (“The Affordable Care
Act,” 2011). It planned to achieve this goal by creating a timeline in which specific provisions
were to be set in place. The most notable being the expansion of Medicaid to low income
individuals, requiring individuals to have healthcare coverage and for employers to cover their
workers, and prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage for preexisting conditions.
Failure to meet the deadline resulted in a penalty for individuals and companies (“The
Affordable Care Act,” 2011).
The Clean Power Plan was announced on August 3, 2015. The policy’s objective was to
cut carbon emissions produced by power plants to 32% below was produced in 2005 (FACT
SHEET: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, 2017). To achieve this, the EPA sets interim and
final goals for each state. The goal is set in three different forms as to provide flexibility on how
each state chooses to meet it. State then produce their own plan for their power plants on how to
achieve lower CO2 levels. The plans are required to be submitted by September 6, 2016 and each
plan must include arrangements that show it is making progress. Interim goals are to be achieved
during the 2022 -2029 period and final CO2 goals are to be achieved by 2030 (FACT SHEET:
Overview of the Clean Power Plan, 2017).
While there is extensive research on the effects of tax policy and government funding on
charitable giving, there is none that analyze the effects that government policies have on the
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revenue of nonprofits who aim to achieve the same mission. Furthermore, the literature supports
that government funding leads to a crowding out of private donations. It is entirely possible that
other forms of government intervention are producing a similar crowding out effect.

Data
The IRS Business Master File (BMF) data provided by Urban Institute National Center
for Charitable Statistics and the National Bureau of Economic Research is used for this analysis.
The IRS Business Master File is a comprehensive list of exempt organizations that is updated
and published on a monthly basis. The BMF contains limited information about each
organization that was provided on their most recent 990 Form, such as the organizations EIN
number, the end date of the most recent tax period filed, and total revenue claimed. The Urban
Institute pulls the data from the IRS database at random times throughout the year. Any
information that may have been updated in the time between data pulls is included in the latest
version. For the analysis on education and health, the BMF data provided from Urban Institute is
utilized. When dealing with the Environmental analysis, the 2017 tax period data provided by the
Urban Institute contained incomplete information. However, The National Bureau of Economic
Research provides such data. NBER only provides BMF data for 2013 onward, so it could not be
used for the entire study. Both sources provide the data for October 2013, so key variables are
compared in the data to verify that the files are essentially the same. The small level of
discrepancy could be attributed to when each organization downloaded the information in
comparison to when the IRS had updated it. It could also be attributed to the Urban Institutes
validation process later done with the NCCS core files.
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For income and poverty variables, data available through the US Census Bureau is
utilized. The Census Bureau provides Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates which contains
the median household income and percent of individuals in poverty on a county level. These
were matched using the FIPS code provided in the NCCS Core files.
Lastly, Yahoo Finance provides information on the S&P 500. Yahoo Finance provides
the daily open, close, high, and low prices for each day. They also provide the daily volume of
the stock. For this analysis, the S&P 500 variable is measured as the average closing amounts for
ten-to-fourteen months prior to the nonprofits 990 tax filing date. This range allows for any
ongoing trends that influence an individual’s donation decision to be captured.

Methodology
To evaluate the effects of public policy on charitable giving, this study uses a threeperiod difference-in-differences fixed effect model. For this analysis, let t = 0,1,2 where t is the
indicator for period. The period before the policy is denoted as t = 0, the first year after the
policy is denoted as t = 1, and subsequent years of policy are denoted as t = 2. Let Z =1 be
treated and zero otherwise. Treatment is defined as a nonprofit whose National Taxonomy of
Exempt Entities (NTEE) classification code matches that of the policy being analyzed. For
example, nonprofits with NTEE code ED (education) are used as the treatment group for the No
Child Left Behind analysis. 𝐼𝑡 is the indicator for the period where 𝐼𝑡 is 1 for period t = 0,1,2 and
zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are the other covariates controlled for in the analysis, such as median
household income, percent of individuals in poverty, and the average S&P 500 one year prior.
The estimated equation takes the form
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(1) 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑖𝑡=2 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑖𝑡=3 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑖𝑡=2 ∗ 𝑍𝑖𝑡=2 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑖𝑡=3 ∗ 𝑍𝑖𝑡=3 +
𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖
with the difference- in-differences for the first year as
(2) 𝐷𝐼𝐷1 = (𝐸[𝑍 = 1, 𝑡 = 2] − 𝐸[𝑍 = 1, 𝑡 = 1]) − (𝐸[𝑍 = 0, 𝑡 = 2] − 𝐸[𝑍 = 0, 𝑡 = 1]) = 𝛽4
and the difference- in-differences for the second year as
(3) 𝐷𝐼𝐷2 = (𝐸[𝑍 = 1, 𝑡 = 3] − 𝐸[𝑍 = 1, 𝑡 = 1]) − (𝐸[𝑍 = 0, 𝑡 = 3] − 𝐸[𝑍 = 0, 𝑡 = 1]) = 𝛽5
Combined with a fixed- effects model, the equation takes the form
(4) 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑖𝑡=2 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑖𝑡=3 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑖𝑡=2 ∗ 𝑍𝑖𝑡=2 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑖𝑡=3 ∗ 𝑍𝑖𝑡=3 +
𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖
where 𝛿𝑐 is the nonprofit level fixed effect. The model above is also analyzed while filtering out

nonprofits whose revenue is positive, and then further filters out the bottom 10th percentile of
revenue. This is done to reduce any potential bias caused by nonprofits who are consistently in
bad financial health and run yearly deficits. Furthermore, a weighted fixed effects model is used
to reduce the effect of extremely small nonprofits on the model output.
The weight is calculated such that
(5) 𝑊𝑖 =
√(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)/(𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)
Combined with the previous model, the equation becomes
(6) 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑖𝑡=2 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑖𝑡=3 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑖𝑡=2 ∗ 𝑍𝑖𝑡=2 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑖𝑡=3 ∗
𝑍𝑖𝑡=3 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖
15

Results
Table 4 below shows the effects of No Child Left Behind on charitable giving. The first
model is a difference-in-differences fixed effects model, the second is a fixed effects model that
removes the bottom ten percent of nonprofits whose total revenue is positive, and the third model
is a weighted fixed effects model. All three models yield negative results on revenue for
education focused nonprofits after the policy is signed into effect. The first basic model indicates
that education nonprofits receive an average of $669,202 less revenue the first year after the
policy and an average of $761,104 less revenue for the subsequent years of the policy. Both
results are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. As expected, the second model shows a
similar effect, with education nonprofits receiving $836,276 less the first year after the policy
and $911,782 less the subsequent years of the policy. Again, these results are significant at the
0.1% level. This slight increase can be attributed to the dropping of charities whose income is in
the lowest 10%. Doing so has removed nonprofits who were already in poor financial standing,
such as bankruptcy, or so particularly small that they would see very little variation in their
revenue. The third model shows the greatest negative effect, with education nonprofits receiving
$3,070,087 less the first year after the policy and $3,292,315 less the subsequent year. Both these
results are statistically significant at the 1% level. As one would suspect, these results indicate
that larger education nonprofits suffer a proportionally greater loss of revenue after No Child
Left Behind is initiated. Such results indicate that public policy geared towards education is a
substitute for donations to education nonprofits. They also indicate a lasting effect past the first
year of the policy, since all the models show an even larger decrease in donations for subsequent
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years of the policy. Donors to these charities likely believe that the government’s intervention is
enough for them to lower or stop their donations and redistribute those funds elsewhere.
Table 5 shows the effects of the Affordable Care Act on charitable giving. Like table 4,
the first model is a difference-in-differences fixed effects model, the second is a fixed effects
model that removes the bottom ten percent of nonprofits whose total revenue is above zero, and
the third model is a weighted fixed effects model. Overall, the models indicate that public policy
has a positive effect on the revenue of health nonprofits. The first model indicates that health
nonprofits saw an average increase of $560,745 the first year after the policy and an average
increase of $844,388.55 in the subsequent years of the policy. These results are statistically
significant at the 0.1% level. The second model shows a slightly larger effect, indicating that
health nonprofits receive an average of $704,752 more the first year after the policy and
$1,049,034 the subsequent years of the policy. These results are also statistically significant at
the 0.1% level. Like before, this increase can be attributed to dropping nonprofits in the bottom
10% of revenue, and therefore likely to see very little variation in revenue. The final model
shows a larger effect, with health nonprofits seeing an average increase of $2,287,859 in revenue
the first year after the policy and an average increase of $3,713,182 the subsequent years. The
first-year results are statistically significant at the 0.1% level and the subsequent year results are
statistically significant at the 5% level. The change in effect from education nonprofits to health
nonprofits can potentially be attributed to the wider range of purpose within the health nonprofit
subsector. Nonprofits categorized under health can range from hospitals to nonprofits focused on
finding a cure for specific illnesses. While the Affordable Care Act aims to provide better,
affordable healthcare to everyone, it is easy to see how some health nonprofits, such as American
Cancer, wouldn’t see a decrease in revenue after such a policy takes effect.
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Table 6 shows the effects of the Clean Power Plan on charitable giving using the same
three models. Like the education analysis, all three models show a negative effect on revenue for
environmental nonprofits after the policy is signed into effect. The first model shows that
environmental nonprofits receive an average of $116,985 less revenue the first year after the
policy and $339,805 less after the subsequent years. The first-year results are statistically
significant at the 5% level and the subsequent year results are significant at the 0.1% level. The
second model produced similar results, with an average decrease of $137,387 in revenue for the
first year and an average decrease of $404,777 for the subsequent years. The first-year results are
significant at the 5.2% level and the subsequent year results are significant at the 0.1% level.
Like the education and health analysis, the third model indicates a larger effect. For the first year
of the policy, environmental nonprofits receive an average of $943,422 less of revenue, and for
the subsequent year they receive an average of $2,580,922 less revenue. The first-year results are
significant at the 10% level, while the subsequent year is significant at the 1% level. Like the
education results above, these results show that larger environmental nonprofits suffer a greater
decline in revenue after the Clean Power Plan is signed, and that the decline continues past the
first year with an even larger decline in the subsequent years. These results indicate that public
policy focused on environmentalism is a substitute for donations to environmental nonprofits.

Conclusion
The nonprofit sector is steadily increasing in size and in percent of GDP for the United
States. With this growth, it is important to look at the different economic factors that can affect
this industry from year-to-year. This study has found that for education and environmental
nonprofits, that public policy acts a substitute for charitable giving, but for health nonprofits it
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acts as a compliment. The negative effects found for the education and environmental nonprofits
also implies that there is some confidence in the U.S government’s ability to properly implement
these policies. Though public policy seems to act as a compliment for health nonprofits, it will
take further analysis into the effects on the different subsectors to be certain.
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Tables

Table 1: No Child Left Behind Analysis Summary Statistics
Variables

Observations

Mean

Total Revenue
First Year of Policy
Subsequent Years of Policy

469,710
469,710
469,710

$4,370,922
0.33
0.33

Standard
Deviation
$62,670,543
0.47
0.47

Treated
First Year of Policy*Treated

469,710
469,710

0.15
0.05

0.36
0.22

Subsequent Years of
Policy*Treated
Median Household Income

469,710

0.05

0.22

469,710

$44,572

$10,869

Percent in Poverty
Average S&P 500

469,710
469,710

11
$1,03

4
$10
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Table 2: Affordable Care Act Analysis Summary Statistics
Variables

Observations

Mean

Total Revenue
First Year of Policy
Subsequent Years of Policy

793,998
793,998
793,998

$1,818,899
0.33
0.33

Standard
Deviation
$37,802,397
0.47
0.47

Treated
First Year of Policy*Treated

793,998
793,998

0.08
0.03

0.27
0.16

Subsequent Years of
Policy*Treated
Median Household Income

793,998

0.03

0.16

793,954

$52,704

$13,630

Percent in Poverty
Average S&P 500

793,954
793,998

14
$1,097

5
$158
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Table 3: Clean Power Plan Analysis Summary Statistics
Variables

Observations

Mean

Total Revenue
First Year of Policy
Subsequent Years of Policy

1,048,599
1,048,599
1,048,599

$4,013,961
0.33
0.33

Standard
Deviation
$112,455,739
0.47
0.47

Treated
First Year of Policy*Treated

1,048,599
1,048,599

0.05
0.02

0.21
0.12

Subsequent Years of
Policy*Treated
Median Household Income

1,048,599

0.02

0.12

1,048,527

$60,129

$16,331

Percent in Poverty
Average S&P 500

1,048,527
1,048,599

14
$1,946

4
$115
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Figure 1: Total Monthly Revenue for No Child Left Behind Analysis
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Figure 2: Total Monthly Revenue for Affordable Care Act Analysis
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Figure 3: Total Monthly Revenue for Clean Power Plan Analysis

25

Table 4: No Child Left Behind Estimates
Fixed Effects
First Year of
Policy*Treated
Subsequent Years
of Policy*Treated
First Year of
Policy
Subsequent Years
of Policy
Average S&P 500
Constant
Observations

Fixed Effects > 40,000 Weighted Fixed Effects

-669,202.91***
(163,979.29)
-761,104.67***
(149,210.64)
164,118.05
(90,508.44)
512,021.38***
(77,659.23)
-247.97
(372.68)
4,474,501.37***
(430,146.14)
469,710

-836,276.02***
(211,725.42)
-911,782.58***
(190,194.07)
177,648.00
(109,088.87)
586,036.88***
(91,144.89)
-349.97
(451.43)
5,349,216.35***
(520,491.25)
397,698

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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-3,070,087.66**
(1,157,778.03)
-3,292,315.22**
(1,027,048.93)
1,520,273.49
(1,233,070.41)
2,410,604.01
(1,256,932.08)
2,462.69
(4,336.89)
9,511,967.70
(5,254,820.10)
469,707

Table 5: Affordable Care Act Estimates

First Year of
Policy*Treated
Subsequent Years of
Policy*Treated
First Year of Policy
Subsequent Years of
Policy
Average S&P 500
Constant
Observations

Fixed Effects

Fixed Effects > 20,000

Weighted Fixed Effects

560,746.39***
(127,842.95)

704,752.35***
(168,571.26)

2,287,859.37***
(618,363.35)

844,388.55***
(231,697.10)
51,637.73**
(17,161.77)
159,377.25***
(25,850.65)
-80.42
(61.21)
1,800,464.54***
(58,372.73)
793,998

1,049,034.67***
(305,186.96)
78,896.95**
(27,807.67)
270,696.65***
(46,107.95)
-243.76*
(112.13)
2,966,634.63***
(103,786.54)
503,073

3,713,182.48*
(1,552,012.27)
57,658.68
(98,288.24)
551,027.93**
(174,826.29)
-723.93
(400.53)
5,986,659.62***
(373,734.25)
793,995

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 6: Clean Power Plan Estimates

First Year of
Policy*Treated
Subsequent Years of
Policy*Treated
First Year of Policy
Subsequent Years of
Policy
Average S&P 500
Constant

Observations

Fixed Effects

Fixed Effects > 25,000

Weighted Fixed Effects

-116,985.79*
(58,930.85)
-339,805.90***
(67,949.27)
-488,810.22**
(167,430.54)
-230,734.14
(159,158.61)
2,800.21***
(703.43)

-137,387.76
(70,569.28)
-404,777.62***
(81,292.43)
-496,652.07**
(189,618.95)
-196,324.44
(182,192.14)
2,965.21***
(791.12)

-943,422.63
(548,433.84)
-2,580,922.66**
(905,996.36)
-1,802,038.42
(1,775,579.20)
-106,315.79
(1,924,306.87)
12,275.15
(6,539.56)

-1,190,497.76
(1,264,707.66)

-757,827.42
(1,421,453.82)

-893,574.48
(11,598,478.18)

1,048,599

881,211

1,048,596

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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